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Introduction 
Syria’s threat to America’s national interest in the Middle East is exaggerated and can only be 
understood in the context of U.S. plans to reconfigure the Middle East. Knowing now that the 
motive for invading Iraq was strategic (to use Iraq as a permanent military operation base), taking 
over Syria would give the United States strategic depth in the region, allowing for the creation of a 
Sunni-dominated state to counterbalance the Shia in Iraq and Iran, in turn tipping the balance of 
power even further in favor of the United States’ regional allies Israel and Turkey. 
The Strategy 
Central to today’s U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is the concept of strategic preemption.[1] 
But this is hardly new. The United States has implemented several policies to safeguard the 
continuous flow of oil and other national interests, including a policy of oil-denial, carried out since 
the mid-1940s; Rapid Deployment Forces during the Carter administration; Dual Containment 
and the “Quiet War” under the Clinton administration; and the Preemptive Doctrine under the 
current Bush administration. These policies have been instrumental in maintaining U.S. 
hegemony in the region and preempting any threats that could damage U.S. interests or those of 
its allies including Israel, Turkey, and the Arab states of the Gulf region.  
In recent decades, the United States has become more aggressive in its preemptive strategy, 
beginning with the Clinton administration’s "Quiet War" (or so it is called in the Middle East) in 
Iraq. 
Following a series of failures by the Clinton administration to rally international support for a UN-
backed attack on Iraq, the United States and Great Britain took unilateral actions to lead a four-
day bombing strike on Baghdad in late December 1998. These overt actions drew heavy criticism 
regionally and worldwide. However, according to former Undersecretary of State Martyn Indyk, 
the United States received the blessing of the Gulf leaders to do things “quietly.”[2] The United 
States changed tactics by more discreetly engaging in destroying Iraq’s military and economic 
infrastructure. This quiet war was carried out by U.S. and British airplanes making daily sorties 
and, using the latest technologies, bombing Iraqi facilities under the pretext that they represented 
potential future threats. 
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush appeared to develop 
the quiet war policy into an open war policy of his own Preemptive Doctrine against the threat of 
terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President Bush’s approach 
was revealed in a document made public by the National Security Strategy of the United States 
(NSS) in September 2002. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described the strategic goals as 
follows: first, “to reassure the American people that the government possessed common sense,” 
adding that “if you recognize a clear and present threat that is undeterrable by the means you 
have at hand, then you must deal with it.” 
Second, “to convey to our adversaries that they were in big trouble.” Powell believes that the 
open war policy of the Preemptive Doctrine sends a strong message to terrorist leaders, making 
them think twice before seizing an opportunity to harm the United States. “It was worth putting the 
leaders of such countries on notice that the potential cost of their opportunism had just gone 
up.”[3] 
Accordingly, the United States had two goals in Iraq: to remove the threat of a rogue regime with 
WMD and to bring democracy to the Middle East through the establishment of a model 
democratic state that would cause a spill-over effect. This would force the Syrian and Iranian 
regimes to re-fashion their systems in ways more compatible with the White House’s views. 
Simultaneously, the proliferation of democracy in the Arab world would ultimately resolve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in line with what Israel has hoped to achieve. Ultimately, with the entire Arab 
world moving towards democracy, the United States would succeed in eradicating the threat of 
terrorism. 
In his own words, President Bush explained that invading Iraq was necessary to “shake off 
decades of failed policy… and advance freedom in the greater Middle East, to help end a cycle of 
dictatorship and radicalization that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our 
own people… if the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of 
the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered and the trend of conflict and fears will 
be ended at its sources.”[4] 
The Reconfiguration of the Middle East 
But Middle East leaders lowered the United States’ expectations about the future of the region at 
the June 2004 G-8 summit meeting. According to newspaper reports,[5] Middle Eastern leaders 
were able to convince President Bush to adopt a more realistic approach to democratization. The 
leaders complained that the United States was dictating its vision on the Middle East by 
presenting its proposal in terms of an initiative and/or plan to democratize the Middle East without 
consulting with the region’s people or leaders. The leaders lobbied for the use of the term 
“partnership” to highlight their desire to work with the United States on issues of tolerance, 
pluralism, economic privatization, and capitalism. The leaders also succeeded in changing the 
term “greater Middle East” to “broader Middle East,” apparently to exclude Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, which are perceived by Arab state leaders as being too undemocratic to be included as 
part of the partnership. The Arab states preferred the partnership to include just them, the United 
States, and Iran. 
Critique 
The Preemptive Doctrine has been critiqued in the United States and the Middle East alike. In the 
United States, the open war policy has generated a serious controversy among supporters of 
“hard” and “soft” power approaches, both of which are in turn heavily criticized by advocates of 
what I call “no” power at all. 
It is no secret that neoconservatives have long planned for the reconfiguration of the Middle East. 
Many cite the neoconservative group Project for the New American Century, which sent a letter to 
President Bush on September 20, 2001, recommending the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, even 
if no direct link to the 9/11 attacks was found.[6] Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has 
admitted that the purpose of the Project for the New American Century was to revive U.S. 
supremacy in global politics, which had been damaged by the failure of Vietnam. Additionally, 
there are several policy papers written by neoconservatives who advocate a series of regime 
changes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria.  
Citing a position paper for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 written by 
now well established neoconservatives—Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David and Meyrav 
Wurmser—titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” Chalmers Johnson 
argues that the attempt to reshape the Middle East began in 1996.[7] According to Johnson the 
four neoconservatives recommend that Israel “advocate the elimination of Saddam Hussein as a 
first step towards regime change in Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.”[8] The paper also 
calls on Israel to reject the 1993 Oslo Accord and “the underlying concept of land for peace and 
to permanently annex the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip.”[9] Johnson concludes that in 
November 2002, “Prime Minister Ariel Sharon echoed these ideas when he urged the United 
States to undertake regime change in Iran as soon as it finished with Iraq.”[10] 
Another neoconservative, Michael Ledeen, relates in the book The War Against the Terror 
Masters his frustration with CIA Director John Deutch in 1996 for not including in CIA plans an 
unexpected attack of a Pearl Harbor magnitude.[11] Contemplating U.S. policy towards the 
Middle East in the aftermath of Desert Storm (Ledeen calls it “Desert Shame”[ 12]), Ledeen 
blames Presidents George H. Bush and Bill Clinton for trusting the UN and not pursuing regime 
change in Iraq.[13] According to Ledeen, Desert Storm made matters worse for the United States 
because it “laid the groundwork for the disastrous decade that followed.”[14] Ledeen further 
argues that “the shortsightedness of the Secretary of State and his top people was of a piece of 
the self-deceiving culture that had led to 9/11 in the first place.”[15] Ledeen states: 
"Just as it was a mistake to conceive of Desert Shame as simply a battle to drive the Iraqi troops 
out of Kuwait, our mission in Iraq should not have been merely “regime change” in Baghdad. We 
should have considered it one battle in the war against the terror masters in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and 
Saudi Arabia. It should have been seen as just one piece of the overall mission, not an end in 
itself. It was folly to believe—as many had to confess they did believe—that we could deal with 
Iraq alone, and then work out a strategy for the others."[16]  
Other neoconservatives downplay the role of international institutions and believe that the United 
States is correct in acting unilaterally. Max Boot and Charles Krauthammer prefer to use the UN 
only when necessary and in ways not to undermine the United States’ position in global politics. 
Krauthammer urged the United States to push for a resolution seeking financial assistance for the 
reconstruction of Iraq in order to entice countries like Pakistan, India, and Russia, who would only 
contribute under a UN umbrella. “The U.S. is not overstretched,” says Krauthammer, “but 
psychologically we are up against our limits. The American people are simply not prepared to 
undertake worldwide nation building.”[17]  
Liberals believe that the United States should have gone to the UN and worked with international 
institutions before invading Iraq. The soft power camp critiqued the open war policy of the 
Preemptive Doctrine for excessive reliance on military might and the overt promotion of U.S. 
national interest.[18] Liberals argue that the Preemptive Doctrine ignores existing international 
law and encourages weaker nations to follow in the United States’ footsteps.[19] 
Nye believes that the United States got it right when it identified transnational terrorism and WMD 
and a combination of both as the major threats to the United States, but added that President 
Bush’s approach fails “to sort out how to go about the implementation process of this 
strategy.”[20] In this matter, Nye calls for the United States to respect alliances and work with 
them so that other countries will join voluntarily, in turn making the alliances more productive for 
the United States.  
"In the global age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve 
the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pickup coalitions of the willing for each 
new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew 
weakening those we have already created.”[21]  
The soft power camp also understands that, from a strategic perspective, the United States’ 
dependency on Middle East oil is disturbing. Projections suggest that demand for Middle East oil 
will continue to increase and at unprecedented rates. In 2002 the MENA region—not including 
Iran—met 42% of Europe’s oil needs, 79% of Japan’s, 93% of Austria’s, and 39% of China.[22] 
By 2025, world oil consumption will increase by 54% over 2000 levels, and OPEC’s share of the 
world’s oil supply will total 54.1% in 2030—up from 28.1% in 2000. 
However, this camp disagrees with the premise that in order to protect U.S. oil interests the 
United States is compelled by the rising threat of terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, the 
emergence of hostile rogue states, widespread anti-Americanism, and increased instability of 
Middle East regimes to be aggressively pro-active in its foreign policy approach. They support a 
multilateral approach working with the UN and the international community. 
The “no” power camp includes well-established scholars such as Samir Amin, Carl Boggs, 
Chalmers Johnson, Gore Vidal, and Immanuel Wallerstein; peace movement organizations 
including Not In My Name and the ANSWER Coalition; and political leaders such as Howard 
Dean and Dennis Kucinick. This camp is anti-war for ideological and humanitarian reasons. 
The "no" power camp argues that the United States has become an imperial power and is in 
decline because it has created too many enemies, as did previous empires before collapsing.[23] 
Accordingly, the "no" power approach highlights America’s interventionist role in global politics 
and claims that the United States has been hijacked by interests other than those of the American 
people. Specifically, this camp points to President George W. Bush’s hawkish cabinet to suggest 
that U.S. foreign policy is being controlled by neoconservatives whose only goal is to control 
Middle East oil.  
As such, they blame the U.S.-led coalition for obstructing the work of the UN in Iraq, and the Bush 
Administration in particular for resorting to unilateralism and interventionism. 
They believe that the United States is worse off than it was before September 11, 2001. 
According to Wallerstein, “When George Bush leaves office, he will be leaving the United States 
significantly weaker than when he assumed office. He will have turned a slow decline into a much 
speedier one.”[24]  
The Middle East 
In the Middle East, the Preemptive Doctrine has been condemned as imperialistic and depicted 
as a ploy to maintain the status quo rather than changing it in a way that would serve the interests 
of the Arab masses. In “How to Achieve Democracy Through Foreign Invasion,” Arab writer 
Hamdan Hamdan questions the United States’ real motive for the reconfiguration of the Middle 
East. Hamdan expresses serious doubt that the United States means well: “How can a 
democratic goal be achieved under a foreign occupation?” He adds, “And since when can 
democracy be achieved without a radical transformation from within a society culminating in the 
rule of law?” According to Hamdan, the Preemptive Doctrine is fundamentally flawed because it is 
imperialistic (a replica of Israeli Zionism) and because it does not respect the natural progress of 
Arab society.[25]  
Moroccan journalist and researcher Abdel Samad Mahieddine develops the same theme, but his 
recommendations are different. According to Mahieddine, democracy cannot be imposed from 
the outside because it is a product of a country’s development and specific historical 
circumstances which cannot be replicated or exported from one country to another. But instead of 
rejecting the United States’ call for democracy, Mahieddine wants the Arab world to endorse it. 
Prefacing his argument with the assumption that the U.S. is not sincere in its call for democracy in 
the Middle East and knowing that Arab leaders will not seek to democratize, Mahieddine wants 
Arab intellectuals and democrats to call America’s bluff—actually welcoming the democratization 
initiative and working to make it happen. According to Mahieddine this is this the only way to 
defeat America’s imperialist design in the Arab world.[26]  
Arab writer Abdel Wahab al Fendi addresses the Preemptive Doctrine from the perspective of 
Arab democrats. He argues that the United States’ recommendations are insulting and degrading 
to the Arab people. According to al Fendi, “the problem is not that the Arabs are illiterate and in 
need to be educated, or poor needing to be fed, or ignorant and needing to be informed; rather 
the problem lies elsewhere…;” and “Arab intellectual democrats are frequently arrested and 
prosecuted and die under torture. If the Arabs are to be helped, they must be helped with getting 
rid of the current regimes, and certainly this will not happen with [the United States] inviting them 
to summit meeting and conferences to discuss the fate of democracy in their part of the world.”[27]   
The Syrian Threat 
Syria has not been named a member of the Axis of Evil, but it has been listed among rogue 
states that the United States considers supporters of terrorism and with WMD. Accordingly, the 
U.S. Congress passed Syria’s Accountability Act in May 2004, and President Bush made it 
comprehensive to include freezing the assets of the Syrian government and those of its citizens. 
A regime change in Syria would serve the United States in at least three specific ways: 
1. First, the new regime would likely be dominated by the country’s Sunni majority. Given 
the Sunnis’ deep seated rivalry with the Shia, such a regime would benefit the United 
States by enabling it to gain leverage in regional politics, particularly vis-à-vis Iran and 
Iraq.  
2. Second, a pro-U.S. regime in Syria would tip the region’s balance of power toward Israel . 
Accordingly the United States and Israel would be in position to dictate a peace 
settlement to the Syrians over the Golan Heights.  
3. Third, with the establishment of a pro-U.S. regime, the United States will have completed 
its final stage of encircling Iran. This would further tip the region’s balance of power in 
favor of Israel , and ultimately would open new doors for the United States to be actively 
involved in toppling the Iranian regime.  
The Specific Threats 
Testifying before a House International Relations Subcommittee Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security John Bolton described Syria as posing a dual threat to the 
United States in the form of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In regard to terrorism, 
Syria is alleged to be a sponsor of organizations the United States considers terrorist, including 
Hizbollah of Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad of Palestine. Although Bolton admits that 
there are no specific ties linking Syria to any of these organizations, he insists that there are 
strong indicators—particularly Syria’s assistance to anti-coalition forces in Iraq. As for the threat 
of WMD Bolton testified that Syria had the most advanced chemical weapons capabilities in the 
Arab world and is “without question, among the states, those most aggressively seeking to 
acquire or develop WMD and the means of delivery.”[28]  
In the area of nuclear energy, according to Bolton, Syria has an effective research and 
development program and has attempted to get dual usage technology from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and is working with China and Russia on developing a civilian nuclear 
energy program. Additionally, even though Syria is a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), it has yet sign to sign the Additional Protocol NPT. Similarly Syria has declined to sign the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and still has not ratified the Biological Weapons Convention it 
signed in 1972. Finally, Bolton testified that Syria has an advanced conventional weapons 
program and hundreds of short and long range missiles equipped with chemical warheads. 
Many of these claims have also been reported by U.S. think tanks and Israeli military analysts 
and officers. Eric Crodly of Monterey’s Center for Non-Proliferation Studies writes that Syria 
conducted a Chemical Weapons (CW) program at its own research center (Centre d’etudes et de 
recherche scientifique) in Damascus and has production facilities in Aleppo and Homs. According 
to Crodly, Syria has produced nerve gas, including VX.[29]  
In its assessment of Syria’s security potential, Jane’s Sentinel reaches similar conclusions. Syria 
is said to possess large quantities of nerve agents and VX and biological agents such as botulism, 
and to have developed an arsenal of WMD to counter Israel’s war machine.[30] Israeli Air force 
Chief of Staff Major General Ben Eliahu[31] and head of Homa Anti-Missile Defense Program Uzi 
Rubin both claim that Syria had been developing WMD and that Syria had acquired the largest 
ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. 
How Real is the Syrian Threat? 
The question remains: how real is the Syrian threat? Inflating Syria’s WMD capabilities can be 
self-serving. The United States and Israel may resort to exaggeration in order to justify the need 
for better weapons (in Israel’s case) or to justify an attack (the United States’ case). Needless to 
say Syria also has a motive to make itself appear more threatening than it actually is. 
Thus, in order to test the credibility of the Syrian threat, the following section will try to examine 
Syria’s capabilities in relation to existing powers in the region. Specifically, I will look at how Syria 
fares in terms of military and economic capabilities in relation to the other regional powers—Israel, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Then, I will move on to discuss the Syrian leadership’s modus 
operandi to see whether or not it has designs that could be interpreted as threatening to the 
United States or its regional allies. 
Military Capabilities 
Syria is a mid-size regional power with adequate conventional capabilities and a finely tuned 
military strategy. Syria does not have the military capabilities or the kind of alliance with NATO 
that its arch-enemies Israel and Turkey have had. But, on balance, the Syrian leadership has 
succeeded in etching a role for itself in regional politics by being pragmatic and building alliances 
with Iran and other Arab countries. Given its military capabilities, Syria is unlikely to project its 
power beyond its current borders or use WMD against the United States or its allies in the region. 
However, Syria will continue to look for any military edge that will give it regional leverage, even if 
that means launching a nuclear program, acquiring WMD, or supporting groups that the United 
States considers terrorists. For Syria, such strategies are a matter of survival. 
Assets 
The Syrian army is massive. The army has been instrumental in domestic politics, successfully 
maintaining order through repressive means, but it has failed to recapture Syrian territory, 
particularly the Golan Heights. This is partly because the Syrian leadership has been more 
concerned with maintaining order in the country than building a sophisticated and well equipped 
military to liberate the territories Syria lost to Israel and Turkey. 
The complex structure of the military combined with its size has reduced the likelihood of plots, 
coups, and rebellions against the Syrian regime. For practical purposes large structures are 
broken down into units and subunits. This allows for close supervision, which in turn means fewer 
opportunities for servicemen to organize and plan to overthrow the regime. This also enabled the 
leadership to uncover seven major rebellion attempts since 1963. 
Additionally, the military’s complicated structure has been instrumental in guaranteeing the 
predominance of the minority Allawites in the Sunni-dominated country. Fearful of a Sunni-led 
military coup, Hafez al Assad created a mechanism capable of reproducing the Alawites’ control 
indefinitely. The military academy has a preferential admission treatment towards the Alawites by 
way of their sectarian background. This enables the regime to control the recruitment process, 
leaving no chance for a Sunni-dominated academy. Once in the academy, recruits are exposed 
to heavy indoctrination in Ba’ath party ideology and in the cult of their leader, the late Hafez al 
Assad. In the upper military echelon, Alawites are appointed to top positions. Deputy Alawites are 
assigned to Sunni commanders, and kept in close contact with other superior Alawite officers 
regarding the Sunni commanders’ activities. It is believed Assad paid special attention to these 
deputies, and even checked in on them with early morning phone calls. 
Liabilities 
But there have been many downsides to the preferential treatment accorded to the Alawites, 
including intra-military conflict and serious disciplinarian problems such as disobedience and 
defections. The ongoing tensions between Alawites and Sunnis have in turn benefited the Muslim 
Brotherhood parties. 
The situation is even more complicated with the new leader, Bachar al Assad. So far Bachar has 
successfully secured his position with many old and new Sunni and Alawite guards supporting 
him. He has been cautionary in his approach to many issues, taking a middle road and not 
rocking the boat too much. He has for example made economic reforms one of his priorities, but 
he has made only mild progress perhaps because of his attempt to accommodate the interests of 
everyone affected by the process. The same can be said about his earlier move to launch an anti-
corruption campaign. That issue is now almost forgotten, perhaps because he believed it to be 
too dangerous to tackle so early in his tenure. But according to specialists, Bachar’s ultimate test 
will be a major domestic or external crisis. At that point his military chiefs can easily decide 
whether to fully trust him or revolt.[32]  
Additionally, the military’s massive size comes at a price Syria can ill afford. The army uses up to 
11% of its GDP. Relative to the region, this is high for a country Syria’s size, and it is a reason 
why Syria remains in debt. Most problematic is that the bulk of the military’s expenditures goes to 
routine maintenance, salaries, and basic necessities such as housing and food. As a 
consequence, Syria is not spending on upgrading its weaponry or training its officers in newly 
developed military technologies. The annual Military Balance for 2003/2004, published by the IIS, 
show that Syria’s most recent arms purchase was in 1999. Considering that the relative 
effectiveness of a military weapon is five years, most of Syria’s military arsenal may now be 
obsolete. 
However, according to some analysts, these same weaknesses make Syria threatening. It is 
believed that Syrian leaders may resort to WMD to compensate for their military’s shortcomings, 
and that Hafez al Assad had used this very tactic to gain leverage in his negotiations with Israel. 
While this seems logical, it appears inconsistent with how the Syrian leadership has operated 
over the years. As I will show in the next section, past experience shows that Syria interprets 
international relations well and, knowing how the world community would reaction to such a tactic, 
Syria is not likely to be the first to resort to WMD. [See Table 1.] 
Table 1: 
Country 
Defense Expenditure as 
% of GDP  
Number Armed 






  1985 2001 2002 1985 2002 2002 2002 
                
Israel 21.2 9.2 9.7 142.0 161.5 425.0 8 
Turkey 3.1 4.9 5.1 630.0 514.8 378.7 150.0 
Saudi Arabia  19.6 14.1 12.0 62.5 199.5 n/a 15.5 
Iran 7.7 3.8 4.6 610 520.0 350.0 40.0 
Syria 16.4 10.9 10.3 402.5 319.0 354.0 108.0 
Egypt 13.0 4.0 3.9 445.0 443.0 254.0 330.0 
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2003/2004. p 336.  
Table 2: 
    Total Armed Forces      
  Army Navy Air Force  Other Active Reservists Total 
Israel 125,000 7,000 35,000 ---- 167,600 358,000 525,600 
Turkey 402,000 52,750 60,100 ---- 515,850 378,700 893,550 
Saudi Arabia  75,000 ---- ---- ---- 124,500 ---- 124,500 
Iran 350,000 18,000 52,000 120,000 540,000 350,000 890,000 
Syria 215,000 4,000 40,000 60,000 319,000 354,000 673,000 
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2003/2004.  
Economic Capabilities 
Syria’s economic capabilities do not support the argument that Syria could become a threatening 
force in the region. In a war scenario, Syria will be handicapped by its poor economy, and as 
such, the country lacks the economic depth needed to sustain a war. Further, that is not expected 
to change any time in the near future. Syria is lagging behind in technological advancement and, 
worse, it is not preparing future generations in technological and scientific fields. Much of this a 
result of a state planned economy. It would take a serious economic overhaul for Syria to develop 
into a contender for a real leadership role in the Middle East. 
Syria is a poor country, a result of its state planned economy program. The state has relied 
heavily on the public sector to build a national economy, but accorded a significant role to the 
private sector. This was done more by necessity than conviction. 
The state sector has generated most of the fixed capital required for the establishment of the 
national economic infrastructure including construction of roads, factories, heavy industry, and so 
on. Additionally, the public sector has been the main source of employment, capital investment, 
and production. 
In this context, the role of the private sector has been limited to light industries, manufactured 
goods, trade, agriculture, and construction. 
According to official documents, Syria considers private entrepreneurs natural allies of the state 
because they both are driven by the same goal—to promote the development of the country. But 
this partnership has failed to live up to its potential. The symbiotic relationship that the state 
intended to establish with the private sector has proven unworkable. Overly politicized, the 
process of national development has become secondary to politics.  
From the start it was obvious the state sought a relationship with the private sector for self-
serving reasons more than anything else. The state had undertaken the major task of building a 
socialist economy with resources it simply did not have. The state’s declared industrialization 
import substitution would require heavy investment, most of which was expected to create an 
economic infrastructure from scratch. More problematic for the state was that the returns on its 
investments in the public industrial sector were long term, and as such the state had to wait up to 
15 years to see earn any kind of profit. The state faced a similar problem with its agrarian 
program. The state embarked on a very promising land reform program, but could not rally its 
people around the policy. Simply put, the people had misgivings about the state, and thus were 
not eager to work the land. The need to fund national development therefore forced the state to 
reach to out to private investors inside Syria and throughout the Arab world. 
In reaching out to the private sector, the state put itself in an awkward position, having to 
reconcile its socialist orientations with those of capitalism. The state ideology has long considered 
the bourgeoisie its main enemy, depicted as a product of the colonial legacy. To now argue 
otherwise would necessitate a serious ideological rethinking, potentially leading to the 
fragmentation of the Ba’ath party, the institution in charge of state politics and its ideological 
underpinnings. In the Marxist-Leninist framework, this was one reason the Ba’ath party failed to 
achieve full totalitarian control of Syria’s society[33] or develop as an institution independent of 
state interference. In the final analysis the party was ineffective, trapped in ideological dogma and 
self-serving political agendas. 
The reliance on private capital forced the state to implement a mixed economy which produced a 
new social structure with vested interest in the maintaining the status quo. To attract much 
needed foreign aid and investment, the state opted for a series of economic liberalization policies 
in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. This enabled the state to funnel most of its funds and 
some of the external aid to the public sector including the military. At the same time, the state 
contracted the implementation of many developmental projects to private entrepreneurs, 
businesses, and military officers. But the absence of accountability and transparency in awarding 
contracts resulted in widespread corruption, most of which benefited the politicians and military. 
Through a system of patronage, the state became an instrument in the hands of the dominant 
political and economic class whose needs converged in such a way that forced them to forge an 
alliance otherwise impossible. The political elite, mostly high ranking Alawite military officers, was 
solely in charge of contracts, licenses, and foreign trade. By virtue of this monopoly they 
accumulated wealth through embezzlement, bribery, and corruption. Simultaneously, the 
economic elite, largely Sunni, needed political power, and so used its newfound relations with the 
Alawite elites to acquire the political influence needed to remain economically vibrant.  
In terms of information technology, Syria ranks below average in the Arab world; less than one 
percent of Syria’s population has access to the Internet whereas the Arab world average is 1.06 
percent. Syria is considered among the least Internet penetrated countries, placing it with the 
likes of Yemen, Iraq, and Libya, and far behind Lebanon and the UAE with 10 and 30 percent 
respectively. Accordingly Syria faces serious problems developing its technological sector. 
Other indicators show slim improvement for Syria’s technological advancement. For example, 
student enrollment in scientific fields at the university level is very low: in 1990-1995 only 2 
percent enrolled in those disciplines.[34] In comparison, in Korea that figure is around 20 percent. 
This means that the Syrian universities are not producing the much needed human resources for 
the development of the country. This lack of interest in the sciences is also reflected in scientific 
innovation, as the Arab Human Development Report noted. The number of patents registered in 
the United States for Syrian companies and individuals is a meager ten against 16,328 for Korea 
and 7,652 for Israel during 1980-2000.  
This only suggest that Syria has a long way to go before it could reach any sort of technological 
development to be a real threat to the United States or its regional allies. Critics argue that Syria’s 
military and economic weaknesses are the reason its will seek to develop nuclear weapons and 
acquire WMD. But as mentioned earlier that, contradicts the Syrian leadership’s pragmatic 
approach to international affairs.  
Leadership 
Syria’s leadership has pursued a principled foreign policy built around deeply rooted philosophical 
orientations and molded to conform to the realities of its region. Syrian leaders view national 
security from a pragmatic perspective, dictated by realism more than idealism. Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that the current Syrian leadership will engage in policies causing the United States or its 
allies (Israel and Turkey) to retaliate in ways detrimental to Syria’s national interest. Most likely 
Syria will adapt to conditions it cannot change. In this instance, if one thing is sure about the 
reconfiguration of the Middle East, it is that Syria will find a way to work within the new existing 
conditions. 
Arab Nationalism 
Syria’s foreign policy has always been identified with Arab nationalism, an ideology that holds that 
the Arab world is historically a single unit and that its contemporary makeup of 22 states is 
artificial. In their political discourses, Syrian leaders have been notorious in making speeches that 
appeal to the Arab psyche. For example, Arabs felt proud when Syrian Foreign Minister Farooq Al 
Sharaa delivered a speech in Washington D.C., standing next to President Clinton and former 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak after yet another failed attempt to restart the peace process. Al 
Shara’s eloquent delivery and lucid references to Israel’s long history of injustices towards the 
Arabs scored high in many parts of the Arab world. Some thought he gave credence to Arab 
diplomacy and wished Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had done the same with his meetings in 
the White House. 
But much of that seems to be solely for Arab public consumption. The Syrian leadership’s support 
for Arab nationalism is a rhetorical reaction to Syria’s historical disappointments more than a 
reflection of an Arab nationalistic policy. Western powers betrayed the Syrians in the World War I 
by not giving them independence in exchange for Syria’s support during the war. The Western 
powers were plotting to partition Greater Syria all along, making it into four separate entities with 
contemporary Syria surrendering nearly a third of its territory to what would be the countries of 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine/Israel. This generated a wave of popular resistance and 
condemnations from the Syrian National Congress in 1919, a national Syrian assembly in 1928, 
and following Ba’ath party declarations.  
The Syrians were also disappointed by the reactions of the international community: the League 
of Nations’ endorsement of the partitioning of Greater Syria, the surrendering of Syria’s territories 
to Turkey, and the UN’s role in the Palestinians’ dispersion, and the Golan Heights. Moreover, the 
Syrians resented France and Great Britain for secretly engineering the Sykes-Picot pact which 
eventually manifested in the carving of Greater Syria, and France for invading Syria, toppling the 
government of Faisal Ibn Hussein al Hashimi, and later for repeatedly nullifying elections and 
canceling parliaments because they did not support France’s policies. Syria believes that 
France’s actions preempted Syria from growing into a full democracy. Syria was the first Middle 
Eastern country to hold elections and its parliamentary experience showed a great potential for a 
future democratic state in Syria.  
It is this misfortune of a colonial legacy that drives the Syrian leadership today. Repeated calls for 
Arab unity and pledges to work towards its realization give legitimacy to a leadership seriously 
challenged for its oppressive rule and over 40 years of martial law. Time and again, Syrian 
leaders have used the dismemberment of Greater Syria, the threat of Israel, and now the U.S. as 
a reminder of why Arabs have to be united.  
But Arab nationalism does not seem to drive Syria’s foreign policy. Rather, it has been used as 
an instrument to keep people from uncovering Syria’s highly sectarian and discriminatory regime. 
Ever since Hafez al Assad took office in the early 1970s, Syria’s political system has been 
dominated by Alawites despite their representation of only ten percent of the entire population. As 
a minority, many Alawites had been groomed by the Ba’ath party and became strong advocates 
of Arab nationalism, enabling them to be fully integrated with the vast majority of the population. 
As Shia, Alawites were considered by some Syrians as non-Muslims and consequently were 
mistreated. In typical Shia fashion, many Alawites have had to hide their true identity. Thus, 
taking on a secular ideology gave the Alawites a new identity and hid their religious differences.  
In foreign policy Syria does not practice Arab nationalism. It makes for good political propaganda 
with no practical results. The Syrian leadership has been pragmatic in pursuing Syria’s national 
interest most of the time, and has even made bold decisions perceived to be contrary to Arab 
nationalism.  
During Lebanon’s civil war, Syria sided with a Maronite-dominated coalition of the Christian Right 
against a Leftist Arab-Palestinian-Muslim coalition when it appeared that the latter coalition was 
poised to win. Had that coalition won, it would have placed the Syrian regime in direct 
confrontation with Israel.  
Similarly, Syria supported Iran against Iraq, an Arab country, in the Iran-Iraq war. This was 
especially troubling for the Gulf State Arabs. The Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) had 
contributed generously to Syria’s national development, providing over $12 billion in assistance, 
and had envisioned Syria as a true ally against Iran, which threaten to ignite an Islamic revolution 
that the GCC leaders could not preempt. But the Syrian leaders were thinking about Syria and 
nothing else. With Egypt’s signing of the Camp David treaty with Israel, Syria felt isolated 
regionally. Iran, which had just won over the hearts of the Arab masses with its Islamic revolution, 
presented itself as a legitimate ally against Israel and the United States, and thus Syria had no 
problem siding with Iran even though it meant betraying an Arab country. In exchange, Iran 
offered Syria the support it needed to stabilize the regional balance of power, thereby making it 
less likely that Israel would launch an attack against Syria.  
Even when Syria seems to be acting according to Arab nationalism, Syria is pursuing its own 
national interests. In the second Gulf war, Syria appeared to have returned to the Arab fold when 
it joined the UN-led coalition to free Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. To Syria this was an 
opportunity to re-integrate into the Arab world. Syria expected to repair its relations with the GCC 
and eventually play the prominent role it once had. True to its words, Syria sent troops to fight 
against Iraq, and following the liberation of Kuwait, Syria proposed an Arab regional security 
system in conjunction with Egypt and the GCC states to protect the region. This system, known 
as the Damascus Declaration, was designed to replace the Western forces. 
Additionally, Syria had to strengthen its relations with the West in the New World Order. Syria had 
lost major Eastern European and Soviet allies. With the U.S. planning for a resolution of the 
Middle East conflict while preparing for the war against Iraq, Syria did not want to risk 
antagonizing the U.S. by not participating in the war. Instead, Syria used the opportunity to 
rejuvenate its ties with the Palestinians, Jordan, and Lebanon, making sure they coordinated 
efforts to reach a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Finally, by participating in the Gulf war alongside UN coalition forces, the United States (and 
tacitly Israel) tolerated the Syrian presence in Lebanon. This earned Syria a legitimate presence 
in Lebanon and the opportunity to influence Lebanese politics at far greater degree than before.  
Syria’s pragmatic approach is also seen in its domestic politics. Syrian leaders have proven that 
they are not ideologues, but shrewd practitioners of realpolitik. A telling example is how Hafez al 
Assad tried to reconcile socialism and privatization—two contradictory policies to development. In 
the early 1970s the regime initiated land reform to earn legitimacy with the rural population, but 
soon realized this move was counterproductive. The redistribution of land alienated landlords and 
investors—the most potent class in the agrarian sector—driving production downhill. Realizing its 
mistake, the leadership proceeded to establish a partnership with the bourgeoisie, urging them to 
invest in their assigned land and state farms. This eased the burden of rural development on the 
state, enabling it to save investment cost and turn to bigger agrarian projects, including hydraulics 
and irrigation.[35]  
Syria’s political approach has been consistently pragmatic. Consequently, a scenario in which 
Syria acquires nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and uses them against the United States 
or its regional allies is unlikely. 
Syria and Terrorism 
Syria’s pragmatism in foreign policy can also be seen in its relationships with Palestinian and 
Lebanese organizations that the United States considers terrorist. In both these instances, the 
Syrian leadership has thought first and foremost about Syria’s national interest and has treated 
these groups more as competitors or clients than allies. The key for successful relationships with 
these groups, as demonstrated historically, has been their eagerness and willingness to play by 
Syrian rules while in Syria’s territory. Short of this, Syrians have taken offense. In an interview to 
an independent Arab newspaper Vice-President Abd al Halim Khaddam best describes Syria’s 
approach to the Palestinians. Addressing the issue of the Oslo agreement that the Palestinians 
signed without Syria’s knowledge, Khaddam appeared patronizing and uncharacteristically 
uncaring: 
"When Arafat came to us in Damascus after the signing of the Oslo Accords, we told him that we 
could not agree with him but we would not fight him. We said to him that he had to taken a 
decision independently, Allah be with him, and that he had to resolve the problem himself. 
However, we warned him that the path he had chosen was a dead-end that would bring no good 
to him or to the Palestinian people.  
Were I to conduct the negotiations in Arafat’s place, I would be ready to face differences of 
opinion with all the world, but never would allow myself to arrive at a difference with Syria. What 
cards does Arafat hold? It would have been appropriate for our brothers in the PLO to have 
drawn on the moral, political, and practical and might of Syria in the negotiating arena. 
Furthermore, they should have understood that if there is no peace between Syria and Israel, 
then there be no peace in the region at all… [The Palestinians] went to Oslo without anyone’s 
knowledge, and therefore we cannot agree to the terms of the Oslo Accords."[36]  
According to Ghada Hashim Talhami, Hafez Al Assad was among the first Arab leaders to use 
Arab nationalism as a means to bring Palestinian guerrillas under Syria’s supervision.[37] Syria’s 
strategic vulnerability in the Golan Heights dictated that they be cautious in their approach, and 
not to give Israel a justification to attack Syria. Consequently, Syria leaders pressed for control of 
the Palestinian guerrillas’ activities in their territory and demanded that the guerrillas’ seek 
permission from Syria’s military before taking action against Israel. Arafat himself was imprisoned 
by Syria for allegedly failing to abide by such rules. Reportedly, Assad told Arafat that he did not 
represent the Palestinians more than he (Assad) did. Following the 1974 Syria-Israel 
disengagement agreement, Syria barred Palestinian guerrillas from using Syrian territory to attack 
Israel. Simultaneously, the Syrians began forming their own factions within the Palestinian 
movement to further their control.  
Syria handled Lebanese guerrillas similarly. Initially Syria assisted in the creation of Hizbollah, 
allowing the organization access to Iranians in the Bekaa Valley. But soon Syria pressed for 
control. Syria has raised strong objections against the establishment of a Shia state by Hizbollah 
or any other organization in Lebanon. Consequently, Syria has fought hard to curb Hizbollah’s 
influence in the Lebanese system, but consistent with its realistic view of the region, Syria has 
been careful not undermine Hizbollah’s potential threat to Israel. Accordingly, Syria has exempted 
Hizbollah from disarming in the South, as per the Taief Agreement which ended the Lebanese 
civil war in 1989, and the Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation, and Co-ordination signed between 
Lebanon and Syria in 1991.[38] This enabled Hizbollah to continue to lead the struggle against 
Israel from Southern Lebanon. All the while, the Lebanese army, backed by Syria, was taking 
control of the rest of Lebanon.[39]  
Conclusion 
The impression that the United States is projecting of Syria as a dominant and interventionist 
state has not been confirmed empirically. Syria’s role in the Middle East has been determined 
more or less by its geography, economy, military, and the political orientations of its leaders. 
Syria’s stretched borders, close proximity to Israel, poor economic condition, and weak military 
capabilities have all forced the Syrian leaders to scale down many of their national aspirations—
including the realization of Greater Syria—and to impose strict control on transnational 
organizations whose activities against Israel are deemed potentially threatening to Syria’s 
national interest. But as calculating as they are, Syria’s leaders must also be aware that 
exercising caution may not be enough to deter threats, and thus, they might have resorted (or 
may resort) to acquiring WMD if for nothing else than to secure their own protection. Whether or 
not Syria will use such weapons against others is debatable. What is certain, however, is that 
using WMD would be inconsistent with Syria’s well established political approach. 
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